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Enhancing Secrecy with Multi-Antenna
Transmission in Millimeter Wave Vehicular
Communication Systems
Mohammed E. Eltayeb, Junil Choi, Tareq Y. Al-Naffouri, and Robert W. Heath, Jr.
Abstract—Millimeter wave (mmWave) vehicular communi-
cation systems will provide an abundance of bandwidth for
the exchange of raw sensor data and support driver-assisted
and safety-related functionalities. Lack of secure communication
links, however, may lead to abuses and attacks that jeopardize
the efficiency of transportation systems and the physical safety of
drivers. In this paper, we propose two physical layer (PHY) secu-
rity techniques for vehicular mmWave communication systems.
The first technique uses multiple antennas with a single RF chain
to transmit information symbols to a target receiver and noise-
like signals in non-receiver directions. The second technique uses
multiple antennas with a few RF chains to transmit information
symbols to a target receiver and opportunistically inject artificial
noise in controlled directions, thereby reducing interference in
vehicular environments. Theoretical and numerical results show
that the proposed techniques provide higher secrecy rate when
compared to traditional PHY security techniques that require
digital or more complex antenna architectures.
Index Terms—Privacy, Vehicular communication, Millimeter
wave, Beamforming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Millimeter wave (mmWave) communication is considered
one of the key enabling technology to provide high-speed
wideband vehicular communication and enable a variety of
applications for safety, traffic efficiency, driver assistance, and
infotainment [1], [2]. Like any communication system, vehicu-
lar communication systems are vulnerable to various security
threats that could jeopardize the efficiency of transportation
systems and the physical safety of vehicles and drivers. Typical
threats include spoofing [3], message falsification attacks [4],
message reply attacks [5], eavesdropping [6], and many others
[3], [7].
A number of encryption protocols based on digital signature
techniques have been proposed in the literature to preserve the
privacy and security of lower frequency vehicular communi-
cation systems [8]-[10]. The shift from lower frequency to
higher frequency mmWave systems, however, introduces new
challenges that cannot be fully handled by traditional cryp-
tographic means. For instance, in lower frequency systems,
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public cryptographic keys can be simply broadcasted over the
wireless channel, however, in mmWave systems, the direction-
ality of the mmWave channel dictates dedicated public key
transmission to all network nodes. This imposes a great deal
of overhead on the system, and might not be an option for
applications that require strict latencies for message delivery or
are time-sensitive. Moreover, these cryptographic techniques
generally require an infrastructure for key distribution and
management which might not be readily available [4], [7].
With the emergence of new time-sensitive safety applications
and the increasing size (more than two billion by 2020 [11])
and heterogeneity of the decentralized vehicular network,
the implementation of traditional cryptographic techniques
becomes complex and challenging.
To mitigate these challenges, keyless physical layer (PHY)
security techniques [12]-[20], which do not directly rely on
upper-layer data encryption or secret keys, can be employed to
secure vehicular communication links. These techniques use
multiple antennas at the transmitter to generate the desired
information symbol at the receiver and artificial noise at
potential eavesdroppers. The precoder design is based on
the use of digital beamforming [12]-[17], distributed arrays
(relays) [16], [17], and/or switched arrays [18]-[20]. In the
digital beamforming techniques [12]-[17], antenna weights are
designed so that artificial noise can be uniformly injected
into the null space of the receiver’s channel to jam potential
eavesdroppers. In the distributed array techniques [16], [17],
multiple relays are used to jointly aid communication from
the transmitter to the receiver and result in artificial noise
at potential eavesdroppers. In the switched array techniques
[18]-[20], a set of antennas, co-phased towards the intended
receiver, are randomly associated with every transmission
symbol. This results in coherent transmission towards the
receiver and induces artificial noise in all other directions.
Despite their effectiveness, the techniques proposed in [12]-
[17] are not suitable for mmWave systems. The high power
consumption of the mixed signal components at the mmWave
band makes it difficult to allocate an RF chain for each antenna
[21]. This restricts the feasible set of antenna weights that can
be applied and makes the precoding design challenging. While
the switched array techniques [18]-[20] can be implemented
in mmWave systems, it was recently shown that the antenna
sparsity, as a result of switching, can be exploited to launch
plaintext and other attacks as highlighted in [22], [23]. In addi-
tion to the limitations, the road geometry restricts the locations
of the potential eavesdroppers in vehicular environments. This
2prior information was not exploited in previous techniques
and can be used to opportunistically inject artificial noise in a
controlled direction along the lane of travel.
In this paper, we propose two PHY security techniques
for vehicular mmWave communication systems that (i) do
not require the exchange of secret keys among vehicles as
done in [8]-[10], and (ii) do not require fully digital antenna
architectures as done in [12]-[17]. In the first technique, a
phased array with a single RF chain is used to design analog
beamformers. Specifically, a random subset of antennas is
used to beamform information symbols to the receiver, while
the remaining antennas are used to randomize the far field
radiation pattern at non-receiver directions. This results in
coherent transmission to the receiver and a noise-like signal
that jams potential eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers.
The proposed technique is different from the switched ar-
ray technique proposed in [20], which also distorts the far
field radiation pattern at non-receiver directions, since: (i)
the switched array technique [20] uses antenna switches to
select a few antennas for beamforming and the remaining
antennas are idle, and (ii) the idle antennas in [20] create
a sparse array which could be exploited by adversaries to
estimate and precancel the sidelobe distortion [22], [23]. The
proposed technique reduces the antenna complexity since it
does not require antenna switches, and the design criteria and
analytical approaches undertaken in this work are different
from [20]. Moreover, there are no idle antennas in the proposed
technique, thus making it difficult to breach.
In the second technique, a phased array with a few RF
chains is used to design hybrid analog/digital transmission
precoders. The hybrid precoders are designed to beamform
information symbols towards the receiver and simultaneously
inject artificial noise in directions of interest. Prior road net-
work information, e.g. boundaries, lane width, junctions, etc.,
is used to opportunistically inject controlled artificial noise
in threat directions instead of spreading the artificial noise in
all non-receiver directions as done in [12]-[17]. This has two
immediate advantages: (i) it allows the transmitter to exploit
its antenna array gain when generating artificial noise, and (ii)
it reduces interference to friendly or non-threat regions. The
road network information can be obtained from an onboard
camera, radar or a geographical information system.
The proposed security technique using the hybrid design is
different from the techniques proposed in [12]-[17], which also
inject artificial noise in non-receiver directions, since these
techniques: (i) require a fully digital antenna architecture,
(ii) do not have the ability to control the directions of the
injected noise, and (iii) do not exploit the array gain in the
generation of the artificial noise. Although hybrid designs
were undertaken in [24]-[28], these designs primarily targeted
cellular systems. Moreover, the design in [28] relies on antenna
subset selection. This reduces the array gain since only a few
antennas are active when compared to the designs in [26], [27].
The hybrid design introduced in this paper requires fewer RF
chains when compared to the hybrid designs undertaken in
[24]-[28], to achieve performance close to that obtained by
digital architectures.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
Fig. 1: Vehicle-to-vehicle communication with a possible
eavesdropper. The transmitting vehicle (Tx) is communicating
with the target vehicle (Rx) while the eavesdropper (E) tries to
intercept the transmitted data. Tx jams regions with horizontal
lines.
Section II, we introduce the system and channel model. In
Sections III and IV, we present the proposed PHY security
techniques. In Section V we analyze the performance of
the proposed techniques and provide numerical results and
discussions in Section VI. We conclude our work in Section
VII.
II. SYSTEM AND CHANNEL MODEL
We consider a mmWave transmitting vehicle (transmitter)
and a receiving vehicle (receiver) in the presence of a single
or multiple eavesdroppers with sensitive receivers as shown in
Fig. 1. The transmitter is equipped with NT transmit antennas
and NRF RF chains as shown in Fig. 2. In the case of a
single RF chain, the architecture in Fig. 2 simplifies to the
conventional analog architecture. We adopt a uniform linear
array (ULA) with isotropic antennas along the x-axis with
the array centered at the origin; nonetheless, the proposed
technique can be adapted to other antenna structures. This can
be done by, for example, varying the complex antenna weights
to form constructive and destructive interference as described
in the Section III or by using a digital or hybrid architecture
as shown in Fig. 2. Since the array is located along the x-y
plane, the receiver’s location is specified by the azimuth angle
of arrival/departure (AoA/AoD) [29]. We consider a single
wiretap channel where the transmitter is assumed to know the
angular location of the target receiver via beam training, but
not of the potential eavesdroppers.
The transmit data symbol s[k] ∈ C, where E[|s(k)|2] =
1 and k is the symbol index, is multiplied by a
unit norm transmit beamforming/precoding vector f =
[f1 f2 ... fNT ]
T ∈ CNT with fn denoting the complex
weight on transmit antenna n. At the receiver, the received
signals on all antennas are combined with a receive combining
unit norm vector w = [w1 w2 ... wNR ]
T ∈ CNR , where
NR is the number of antennas at the receiver. We assume a
narrow band line-of-sight (LOS) channel with perfect synchro-
nization between the transmitter and the receiver.
Due to the dominant reflected path from the road surface, a
two-ray model is usually adopted in the literature to model
3Fig. 2: Proposed hybrid architecture where the number of
antennas NT are much larger than the number of RF chains.
In the case of a single RF chain, the antenna architecture
simplifies to the conventional analog architecture.
LOS vehicle-to-vehicle communication [30]-[35]. Based on
this model, the received signal can be written as [30]-[35]
y(k, θ) =
√
Pαh∗(θ)fs(k) + z(k), (1)
where k is the kth transmitted symbol, θ is AoD from the
transmitter to the receiver, α is the path-loss, P is the trans-
mission power, h∗(θ) = w∗H(θ, φ) is the effective channel
after combining, and z(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2) is the additive noise.
The channel H(θ, φ) is given by
H(θ, φ) = gar(φ)a
∗(θ), (2)
where the vectors ar(φ) and a(θ) represent the receive and
transmit array response vectors, φ is the receiver’s AoA, and
the random variable g captures the small scale fading due to
multi-path and/or doppler spread. For sub-6 GHz frequencies,
the distribution of g is shown to be Gaussian in [30], however,
to the best of the author’s knowledge, the distribution of g is
unknown for 60 GHz frequencies. Nonetheless, it should be
noted that beamforming at both the transmitter and receiver
leads to a smaller Doppler spread and larger coherence time
[36], [37]. Additionally, the angular variation is typically an
order of magnitude slower than the conventional coherence
time [36], therefore the overhead to align both transmit and re-
ceive beams is not substantial. Setting w = ar(φ)√
NR
, the channel
h∗(θ) becomes h∗(θ) =
√
NRga
∗(θ). For a ULA with d ≤ λ2
antenna spacing, the array response vectors a(θ) and ar(φ)
are a(θ) = [ej(
NT−1
2
) 2pid
λ
cos(θ), ej(
NT−1
2
−1) 2pid
λ
cos(θ), ...,
e−j(
NT−1
2
) 2pid
λ
cos(θ)]T, and ar(φ) = [e
j(
NR−1
2
) 2pid
λ
cos(φ),
ej(
NR−1
2
−1) 2pid
λ
cos(φ), ..., e−j(
NR−1
2
) 2pid
λ
cos(φ)]T [29].
III. ANALOG BEAMFORMING WITH ARTIFICIAL JAMMING
In this section, we introduce an analog PHY security tech-
nique that randomizes the information symbols at potential
eavesdroppers without the need for a fully digital array or
antenna switches. We adopt the antenna architecture shown
in Fig. 2 with a single RF chain. The antenna switches in
Fig. 2 are not required for the analog beamforming design.
Instead of using all antennas for beamforming, a random
subset of antennas are set for coherent beamforming, while
the remaining antennas are set to destructively combine at
the receiver. The indices of these antennas are randomized
in every symbol transmission. This randomizes the beam
pattern sidelobes. Although the target receiver would observe
gain reduction, malicious eavesdroppers will observe non-
resolvable noise-like signals.
Let IM (k) be a random subset of M antennas, where M is
selected such that NT−M is an even number, used to transmit
the kth symbol, IL(k) be a subset that contains the indices of
the remaining antennas, EL(k) be a subset that contains the
even entries of IL(k), and OL(k) be a subset that contains the
odd entries of IL(k). The nth entry of the analog beamforming
vector f(k) is set as fn(k) =
1√
NT
ejΥn(k) where
Υn(k) =


(
NT−1
2 − n
)
2π dλ cos(θR), n ∈ IM (k)(
NT−1
2 − n
)
2π dλ cos(θR), n ∈ EL(k)(
NT−1
2 − n
)
2π dλ cos(θR) + π, n ∈ OL(k)
(3)
where θR is the transmit direction towards the target receiver.
Note for n ∈ OL(k),
fn(k) =
1√
NT
ej((
NT−1
2
−n)2π dλ cos(θR)+π)
= − 1√
NT
ej((
NT−1
2
−n)2π dλ cos(θR)). (4)
Using (1)-(4), the received signal at an arbitrary receiver
becomes
y(k, θ) =
√
Pαh∗(θ)f(k)s(k) + z(k)
=
√
NRPαga
∗(θ)f(k)s(k) + z(k)
=
√
NRPα
NT
gs(k)
( ∑
m∈IM(k)
e−j(
NT−1
2
−m) 2pidλ cos(θR)×
ej(
NT−1
2
−m) 2pidλ cos(θ) +
∑
n∈EL(k)
e−j(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θR)×
ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θ) −
∑
n∈OL(k)
e−j(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θR)×
ej(
N−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θ)
)
+ z(k)
=
√
Pαg︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective
channel gain
√
NRβ︸ ︷︷ ︸
array gain
s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
+ z(k)︸︷︷︸
additive
noise
, (5)
where
β =
√
1
NT
( ∑
m∈IM (k)
ej(
NT−1
2
−m) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
+
∑
n∈EL(k)
ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)) −
∑
n∈OL(k)
ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
)
. (6)
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Fig. 3: Comparison of the numerical and theoretical values for
the CDF of β Fβ(x) = 1−Q
(
x−E[β]√
var[β]
)
; NT = 64, M = 48,
θR = 100
◦, and θ = 60◦.
Note when θ = θR, the term β =
M√
NT
and the array gain in
(5) becomes a constant. When θ 6= θR, the term β becomes a
random variable. This randomizes the array gain at directions
θ 6= θR, and as a result, jams eavesdroppers at these directions.
In the following Lemma, we characterize the random variable
β for large number of transmit antennas NT.
Lemma 1: For sufficiently large NT and M , and θ 6= θR, β
converges to a complex Gaussian random variable with mean
E[β] =
M
NT
√
NT
sin
(
NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
sin
(
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
) , (7)
and variance
var[β] =
N2T −M2
N2T
. (8)
Proof: See Appendix A for proof.
In Fig. 3, we plot the real and imaginary cumulative
distribution function (CDF) of β. For validation purposes, we
also plot the theoretical CDF of a Gaussian random variable
with similar mean and variance. From the figure, we observe
that numerical and theoretical (using (8), (45), and (47)) CDFs
are identical.
IV. HYBRID BEAMFORMING WITH OPPORTUNISTIC NOISE
INJECTION
The proposed PHY security technique in the previous sec-
tion enhances the communication link secrecy by randomizing
the sidelobes of the far field radiation pattern. This jams
the communication link in all non-receiver directions. It is
sometimes desirable to radiate interference (or artificial noise)
in controlled directions only. For example, if the vehicle is
performing joint radar and communication [38], [39], the jam-
ming signal might interfere with the radar signal. In addition,
the geometric design of the road restricts the location of
potential eavesdroppers. Equipped with this prior information,
Fig. 4: An example of two transmitters (in (a) and (b)) oppor-
tunistically injecting artificial noise in non-receiver directions.
Regions with horizontal lines receive controlled noise.
it is sensible to jam receivers in threat regions only. This allows
more power to be radiated in threat regions and, as a result,
increases the interference power and minimizes interference
to other non-threat regions.
In this section, we propose a PHY security technique for
mmWave vehicular systems that exploits prior knowledge of
the location of the target vehicle and road network geometry.
We use side information of the road and lane width, traffic bar-
riers, and curvature, to opportunistically inject controlled artifi-
cial noise in potential threat areas (see Fig. 4). In the following,
we first introduce the proposed PHY security technique using
fully digital transmission precoders. Following that, we adopt
the antenna architecture shown in Fig. 2 and design hybrid
analog/digital transmission precoders that approximate fully
digital transmission precoders with NRF ≪ NT RF chains.
A. Digital Precoder Design
Let fs be a data transmission beamformer and fn be an
artificial noise beamformer. Also let the set T define the range
of angles along the road where potential eavesdroppers can be
located. This can be obtained from prior knowledge of the
road geometry. The beamformer fs is designed to maximize
the beamforming gain at θ = θR. Under our LoS and ULA
assumptions, the beamforming solution that maximizes the
beamforming gain at the receiver is the spatial matched filter
[29]. Therefore fs becomes
fs =
1√
NT
a(θR). (9)
To design the beamformer fn, we first obtain a matrix B of
size NT × NT with NT columns orthogonal to the receiver’s
channel. Using a combination of these columns, we then
design a unit norm beamformer fn to have a constant projection
5on θ ∈ T , i.e.
a∗(θ)fn = q(θ), (10)
where q(θ) = 1 if θ ∈ T and 0 otherwise. Using the House-
holder transformation, the matrix B can be expressed as
B = I− 1
NT
a(θR)a
∗(θR),
where I is the identity matrix. Since the columns of B are
orthogonal to a∗(θR), their combination, and hence fn, will be
orthogonal to a∗(θR) as well. Using B, the design objective
of (10) becomes finding a solution for
A∗Bx = q, (11)
where A = [a(θ1), ..., a(θLd)] is the array response matrix,
Ld > NT is the total number of possible transmit directions,
x ∈ CNT , and q = [q(θ1) ... q(θLd)]T. The indices of
the non-zero entries of x in (11) correspond to the selected
columns of the matrix B, and their values correspond to
appropriate weights associated with each column. The least-
squares estimate of x is
xˆ = (Z∗Z)−1Z∗q, (12)
where Z = A∗B. Using (10)-(12), the beamformer fn becomes
fn = CBxˆ, where C is a normalization constant that results
in ‖fn‖2 = 1.
Based on fs and fn, the precoder f(k) becomes
f(k) =
√
ǫfs +
√
(1− ǫ)fnη(k), (13)
where ǫ denotes the power fraction allocated for data trans-
mission and it takes a value between 0 and 1, and η(k) is the
artificial noise term. The artificial noise term η(k) can take any
distribution, however, for simplicity of the analysis, we assume
η(k) = ejΘ(k), with Θ(k) uniformly distributed between 0 and
2π. Using (13), the received signal at an arbitrary receiver
becomes
y(k, θ) =
√
PαNRh
∗(θ)f(k)s(k) + z(k) (14)
= s(k)︸︷︷︸
information
symbol
(
√
PαǫNRga
∗(θ)fs︸ ︷︷ ︸
effective
channel gain
+
√
Pα(1− ǫ)NRga∗(θ)fnη(k)︸ ︷︷ ︸
artifical
noise
) + z(k)︸︷︷︸
additive
noise
.(15)
Note that fn in (15) is orthogonal to a
∗(θR), and therefore,
the target receiver (at θ = θR ) is not affected by the artificial
noise term.
B. Hybrid Analog/Digital Precoder Design
Due to hardware constraints, the transmitter may not be
able to apply the unconstrained entries of f(k) in (13) to
form its beam. As discussed in [26] and [27], the number
of RF chains NRF ≪ NT, and the analog phase shifters have
constant modulus and are usually quantized to yield L < Ld
constrained directions [26]. One possible solution is to use
a limited number of RF chains together with the quantized
phase-shifters to form a hybrid analog/digital design. To design
the hybrid precoder, we set fh(k) = FRF(k)fBB(k), where the
subscript h refers to hybrid precoding, FRF(k) is an NT×NRF
precoder, and fBB(k) is an NRF×1 digital (baseband) precoder.
Consequently, the design of the precoder is accomplished by
solving [26]
{F⋆RF(k), f⋆BB(k)} = argmin ‖f(k)− FRF(k)fBB(k)‖F, (16)
s.t. [FRF(k)]:,i ∈ {[Acan]:,ℓ|1 ≤ ℓ ≤ L}, i = 1, · · · , NRF − 1,
‖FRF(k)fBB(k)‖2F = 1,
where Acan = [a(θ1), ...., a(θL)] is an N × L matrix that
carries all set of possible analog beamforming vectors due
to the constant modulus and angle quantization constraint on
the phase shifters, and θl ∈ {0, 2πL , ..., 2π(L−1)L } [26]. Given
the matrix of possible RF beamforming vectors Acan, the
optimization problem in (16) can be reformulated as a sparse
approximation problem which is solved using matching pursuit
algorithms as proposed in [27] (Algorithm 1) to find f⋆BB(k)
and F⋆RF(k) and consequently fh(k) as follows
fh(k) = F
⋆
RF(k)f
⋆
BB(k). (17)
One drawback of this solution is that the entries of the
matrix Acan are constrained by the hardware limitations of
the analog phase-shifters. This results in a grid mismatch since
the unconstrained digital precoder is designed using a matrix
A with unconstrained entires, i.e. θl is not constrained. This
grid mismatch results in a spectral spillover and destroys the
sparsity of the optimization problem in (16). This issue was
resolved in [26] and [27] by increasing the number of RF
chains. While larger number of RF chains might be justifiable
for cellular systems, the high power consumption and cost of
these arrays might limit their use to luxurious vehicles only. In
the following, we propose a simple technique that relaxes the
RF limitations and as a result, requires less RF chains when
compared to the design proposed in [26] and [27].
C. Hybrid Design with Antenna Selection
In the previous hybrid design, the antenna spacing d is kept
constant. Therefore, the number of columns of the matrix
Acan in (16) was L. When antennas are allowed to switch
on/off, the number of columns becomes (2NT − 1)L, since
for every column, there are 2NT − 1 combinations. This
provides additional degrees of freedom which could be used
to reduce the number of RF chains at the expense of increased
computational complexity since the number of antennas is
generally large in mmWave systems. To reduce the compu-
tational complexity, we randomly group Ng antennas, and
on/off switching is applied to each group instead of individual
antennas. This reduces the number of columns of the of the
matrix Acan to (2
NT/Ng − 1)L.
In Fig. 5, we design the precoders f(k) and fh(k) with
θR = 90
◦ and T ∈ {0, ..., 60, 120, .., 150} degrees, and plot
the resulting beam pattern, i.e. we plot |a∗(θ)f(k)|2 for the
digital antenna architecture and |a∗(θ)fh(k)|2 for the hybrid
antenna architecture. Fig. 5(a) shows the pattern obtained when
using a fully digital architecture. Fig. 5(b) shows the pattern
obtained when using the proposed hybrid architecture with
antenna switching. As shown, the resulting pattern is similar
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Fig. 5: Resulting beam pattern of a patch antenna with NT = 32 and a front-to-back ratio of 21.63 dB; (a) fully digital
architecture, (b) proposed hybrid architecture with Ng = 8, (c) hybrid architecture [26], [27], (d) hybrid architecture using
antenna switches [28]. The number of RF chains is fixed to NRF = 8 for all hybrid architectures, Ld = 360, L = 256 (or 8-bit
angle quantization), θR = 90
◦, T ∈ {0, .., 60, 120, ..., 180}, and ǫ = 0.1.
to the pattern obtained when using a fully digital architecture
with just 8 RF chains. Fig. 5(c), shows the pattern obtained
when using the hybrid architecture proposed in [26] and [27].
As shown, the resulting pattern is not accurate and requires
more RF chains to realize good beam patterns. Fig. 5(d)
shows the pattern obtained when using the hybrid architecture
proposed in [28] with switches only. While some similarities
exist between the resulting pattern and the fully digital pattern,
we observe tremendous beamforming gain loss, especially at
θ = θR. The reason for this is that the design in [28] is based
on antenna subset selection (without phase shifters) which
results in a beamforming gain loss as shown in Fig. 5(d). In the
proposed design, both phase-shifters and switches are jointly
used to approximate the digital precoder with just a few RF
chains.
V. SECRECY EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed
mmWave secure transmission techniques in terms of the
secrecy rate. In our analysis, the transmitter is assumed to
know the angular location of the target receiver but not of
the potential eavesdropper. Both the target receiver and the
eavesdropper are assumed to be equipped with a matched filter
receiver and have perfect knowledge of their channels at all
times.
The secrecy rate R is defined as the maximum transmission
rate at which information can be communicated reliably and
securely, and is given by
R = [log2(1 + γR)− log2(1 + γE)]+, (18)
where γR is the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the target
receiver, γE is the SNR at the eavesdropper, and a
+ denotes
max{0, a}. We assume an eavesdropper with a sensitive re-
ceiver and, for mathematical tractability, the gain g is assumed
to be constant and set to g = 1. As shown in [36], directional
beamforming at both the transmitter and the receiver make
the coherence time to become quite long. This justifies the
assumption of a fixed g at the target receiver and allows
us to account for the effects of the artificial noise on the
eavesdropper and derive the secrecy rate.
A. Analog Beamforming Secrecy Rate
The SNR at the target receiver at θ = θR is given by (see
(5))
γR =
PαNR|gβ|2
σ2
=
PαNRM
2
NTσ2
. (19)
To derive the SNR at an eavesdropper at θ 6= θR, we rewrite
(5) as
yE(k, θ) =
√
PαEgENEβ + zE(k) (20)
=
√
PαEgENE(β1 + β2)s(k) + zE(k), (21)
where NE is the number of antennas at the eavesdropper, gE
is the eavesdropper’s channel gain, αE is the eavesdropper’s
path loss, and zE(k) ∼ CN (0, σ2E) is the additive noise at the
eavesdropper. In (20), the constant β1 = E[β] is the beam-
forming gain at the eavesdropper and the term β2 = β−E[β]
is a zero mean random variable that represents the artificial
noise at the eavesdropper. Using (21) and Lemma 1, the SNR
at the eavesdropper at θ 6= θR becomes
γE =
PαENE|gE|2|β1|2
PαENE|gE|2var[β2] + σ2E
, (22)
where the random variable β is defined in (40). Letting NE →
∞ we obtain
γ¯E =
|E[β]|2
var[β]
, (23)
where γ¯E is the limit of γE for large numbers of receive
antennas, and γE < γ¯E. From Lemma 1,
E[β] =
M
NT
√
NT
sin
(
NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
sin
(
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
) , (24)
and
var[β] =
N2T −M2
N2T
. (25)
Using (24) and (25), (23) becomes
γ¯E =
M2
NT(N2T −M2)
(
sin2
(
NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
sin2
(
πd
λ (cos(θ) − cos(θR))
) ). (26)
7Using (19) and (26), we quantify a lower bound on (18) as
follows
R>
[
log2
(
1 +
PαNRM
2
NTσ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
M2
NT(N2T −M2)
×
sin2
(
NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
sin2
(
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
) )]+. (27)
Equation (27) shows that the secrecy rate is a function of
the subset size M . Increasing M increases the rate at the
target receiver (first part of (27)) at the expense of lower noise
variance at θ 6= θR as shown in the second part part of (27)).
Therefore, there is an optimum value of M that maximizes
the secrecy rate in (27).
Remark 1: To guarantee secrecy, the value ofM is selected
to satisfy γR > γ¯E, i.e.
ρM2
NT
>
M2u(θ)
NT(N2T −M2)
, (28)
where ρ = PαNRσ2 and u(θ) =
sin2(NT pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)))
sin2(pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)))
.
Solving for M we obtain the following upper-bound on M
M <
√
N2T −
u(θ)
ρ
. (29)
From (29) we observe that if u(θ) = 0 (eavesdropper is in one
of the antenna nulls) or ρ→∞ (σ2 → 0), then M = NT − 1
satisfies the inequality in (28). We also observe that if σ2 is
high, i.e. ρ is low, then the upper-bound in (29) decreases and
higher values of M are required to increase the artificial noise
at non-receiver directions. Note that this bound is pessimistic
since we assumed an eavesdropper with infinite array gain.
B. Hybrid Beamforming with Opportunistic Noise Injection
Secrecy Rate
To derive the SNR at the receiver and eavesdropper, we
assume that there are a sufficient number of RF chains to
perfectly approximate the digital precoder. The receive SNR
at the target receiver (at θ = θR) can be written as (see (15))
γR =
NRPαǫ|h∗(θR)fs|2
σ2
=
PαǫNRNT
σ2
, (30)
where the second term of (15) does not appear in (30) since
fn is orthogonal to h
∗(θR), and |h∗(θR)fs|2 = NT.
The SNR at the eavesdropper (at θ 6= θR ) can be derived
as
γE =
ǫNEPαE|h∗(θ)fs|2
(1− ǫ)NEPαE|h∗(θ)fn|2var[η(k)] + σ2E
(31)
=
PαEǫNE|gE|2|a∗(θ)fs|2
PαE(1− ǫ)NE|gE|2|a∗(θ)fn|2var[η(k)] + σ2E
. (32)
Letting NE →∞ we obtain
γ¯E =
ǫ|a∗(θ)fs|2
(1− ǫ)|a∗(θ)fn|2 , (33)
where γE < γ¯E and var[η(k)] = 1. The term |a∗(θ)fs| in (33)
is a constant and it can be derived as
|a∗(θ)fs|
=
∣∣∣∣ 1√NT
NT−1∑
n=0
e−j(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θR)ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ cos(θ)
∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣ 1√NT
NT−1∑
n=0
ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
∣∣∣∣
=
sin
(
NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
√
NT sin
(
πd
λ (cos(θ) − cos(θR))
) . (34)
Note that the term |a∗(θ)fn|2 in (33) represents the beamform-
ing gain at θ ∈ T and it is given by |a∗(θ)fn|2 = πµ(T ) [40],
where µ(T ) is the length of the angle interval in T , i.e. sector
size. This expression applies to sectors formed using ideal
beam patterns which do not overlap. Since beam patterns of
this form are usually unrealizable, there will be some “leaked”
power radiated at angles θ 6∈ T . This reduces the beamforming
gain at θ ∈ T . To account for this, we set |a∗(θ)fn|2 = πc0µ(T ) ,
where 0 < c0 < 1 is a constant that accounts for beam pattern
imperfections. Therefore (33) can be written as
γ¯E =
µ(T )ǫ sin2 (NT πdλ (cos(θ)− cos(θR)))
π(1 − ǫ)c0NT sin2
(
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
) .(35)
Using (30) and (35), the secrecy rate is lower bounded by
R >
[
log2
(
1 +
PαǫNTNR
σ2
)
− log2
(
1 +
µ(T )ǫ sin2 (NT πdλ (cos(θ)− cos(θR)))
(1 − ǫ)c0πNT sin2
(
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR))
))]+.(36)
Equation (36) shows that the secrecy rate is a function of
the transmission power fraction ǫ and the sector size µ(T ).
Increasing ǫ results in a lower secrecy rate since more power
will be invested in data transmission to the target receiver
rather than artificial noise injection. We also observe that for
fixed ǫ, increasing µ(T ) (second part of (36)) decreases the
secrecy rate since the artificial noise power will be radiated
over larger sector sizes. Therefore, for a fixed transmission
power, the transmitter can optimize the secrecy rate by choos-
ing appropriate sector sizes. Prior road geometry information
could be exploited to optimize the sector size µ(T ).
Remark 2: To guarantee secrecy, the value of ǫ is selected
to satisfy γR > γ¯E, i.e.
ζǫ >
µ(T )ǫν(θ)
π(1 − ǫ)c0 , (37)
where ζ = PαNTNRσ2 and ν(θ) =
sin2(NT pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)))
NT sin2( pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)))
.
Solving for ǫ we obtain the following upper-bound
ǫ < 1− ν(θ)µ(T )
ζπc0
. (38)
From (38) we observe that if ν(θ) = 0 (i.e., eavesdropper
is in one of the antenna nulls) or ζ →∞ (i.e., σ2 → 0), then
ǫ ≈ 1 < 1 satisfies the inequality in (37) and most transmission
power can be directed towards symbol transmission. We also
observe that if the noise variance at the target receiver is high,
8i.e. ζ is low, then the upper-bound in (38) decreases, and
as a result, the sectoe size µ(T ) should be reduced and/or
more power power should be directed towards artificial noise
injection at non-receiver directions. Note that the bound in
(38) is pessimistic since an eavesdropper with infinite array
gain is assumed.
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS
In this section, we study the performance of the proposed
security techniques in the presence of a single eavesdropper
with a sensitive receiver. The system operates at 60 GHz with
a bandwidth of 50 MHz and an average transmit power of
37dBm. A standard two-ray log-distance path loss model with
exponent 2 is used to model the mmWave communication
channel. Unless otherwise specified, the number of antennas
at the target receiver is NR = 16 and the number of antennas
at the eavesdropper is NE = 500. For simulations purposes,
the eavesdropper’s channel is assumed to be random with
gE ∼ CN (0, 1). The distance from the transmitter to the
receiver is set to 50 meters, the distance from the transmitter
to the eavesdropper is set to 10 meters.
In Figs. 6(a) and (b), we plot the secrecy rate achieved by
the proposed analog beamforming technique versus the eaves-
dropper’s angular location for NT = 32 and NT = 16. For
both cases, we observe that the secrecy rate of the proposed
technique is high at all angular locations except at the target
receiver’s angular location (θR = 120
◦). We also observe that
the switched array technique proposed in [20] provides high
secrecy rate, while conventional array techniques provide poor
secrecy rates. The reason for this is that conventional array
transmission techniques result in a constant radiation pattern
at the eavesdropper while, the proposed and the switched
array techniques randomize the radiation pattern at the eaves-
dropper, thereby jamming the eavesdropper. For the proposed
and switched array transmission techniques, no randomness
is experienced at the target receiver, and the secrecy rate
is minimum when the eavesdropper is located in the same
angle with the target receiver, which is generally not the
case in practice. We also observe that the proposed technique
is better than switched array techniques especially when the
eavesdropper is closely located to the target receiver, i.e. when
|θR − θ| is small, which is typically the worst case scenario.
When |θR − θ| is large, the figure shows that the switched
array technique proposed in [20] provides comparable secrecy
rates with the proposed technique. The proposed technique,
however, is still superior to [20] since: (i) The switched array
technique requires antenna switches to jam eavesdroppers. The
proposed technique does not require antenna switches. (ii) The
idle antennas in the switched array technique creates a sparse
array which could be exploited by adversaries to precancel
the jamming signal. The proposed technique uses all antennas,
therefore making it difficult to breach.
In some instances, Figs. 6(a) and (b) show that conventional
array techniques provide better secrecy rates when compared
to the proposed and switched array techniques. This is par-
ticularly observed when the eavesdropper falls in one of the
nulls (or closer to the null directions) of the transmit array
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Fig. 6: Comparison between the simulated and theoretical (eq.
(27)) secrecy rate for linear arrays with different length when
steered to θR = 120
◦; M = 12.
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Fig. 7: Simulated and theoretical secrecy rate average over the
transmit angle θ versus the subset size M for linear a array
steered to θR = 120
◦; θ ∈ {{110◦, ..., 130◦}\{θR}},NT = 32.
pattern. Since conventional techniques use all antennas for data
transmission, these techniques would result in higher secrecy
rates when the eavesdropper falls in one of the nulls (or closer
to the null directions) of the transmit array pattern.
In Fig. 7 we examine the impact of the transmission
subset size M on the secrecy rate of the analog beamforming
technique. We observe that as the subset size M increases, the
secrecy rate of the proposed technique increases, plateaus, and
then decreases. The reason for this is that asM increases, more
antennas are co-phased for data transmission. On one hand,
this increases the beamforming gain at the target receiver.
On the other hand, increasing M decreases the variance of
the artificial noise at the eavesdropper. Therefore, there is a
trade-off between the beamforming gain at the receiver and the
artificial noise at a potential eavesdropper, and there exists an
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Fig. 8: Numerical and theoretical (eq. (57)) values of the beam
pattern variance at θ = 115◦ versus the subset size M for
linear a array steered to θR = 120
◦; NT = 32.
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Fig. 9: Numerical and theoretical (eq. (36)) values of the
secrecy rate versus the eavesdroppers angular direction for
different values of NT. Artificial noise is injected in all non-
receiver directions with ǫ = 0.5. For the hybrid architecture,
NRF = 10 with 6-bit angle quantization, and Ng = 8.
optimum value of M that maximizes the secrecy rate. In Fig.
7, we also show that the proposed technique achieves higher
secrecy rate when compared to conventional transmission
techniques and the switched array technique proposed in [20],
especially for higher values ofM . Moreover, we show that the
theoretical bound of the secrecy rate is tight when compared
to the secrecy rate obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. This
verifies the correctness of our analysis and enables us to gain
further insights into the impact of key parameters such as, the
subset size M and number of transmit/receive antennas, on
the system performance.
In Fig. 8 we plot the numerical and theoretical values of the
beam pattern variance at θ = 115◦ when using the proposed
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Fig. 10: Secrecy rate versus the transmission power fraction ǫ.
Artificial noise is injected in all non-receiver directions, NT =
32, and θR = 120
◦. For the hybrid architecture, NRF = 10
with 6-bit angle quantization, and Ng = 8.
technique and the switched array technique. Note that higher
beam pattern variance increases the variance of the artificial
noise. As shown, the proposed technique provides higher beam
pattern variance when compared to the switched array and
conventional techniques. In the switched array technique, only
M antennas are used to generate the jamming signal, while the
remaining NT−M antennas are idle. The proposed technique
uses M antennas for data transmission and NT−M antennas
to randomize the beam pattern at potential eavesdroppers. This
results in higher secrecy rate. The variance of the conventional
technique is zero since the beam pattern is fixed and the
transmitter does not generate any artificial noise.
In Figs.9(a) and (b), we plot the secrecy rate versus the
eavesdroppers angular direction when implementing the pro-
posed security technique with opportunistic noise injection
using a digital architecture and the proposed hybrid architec-
ture. For comparison, we also plot the secrecy rate achieved
when implementing the security technique proposed in [17]
which injects artificial noise in the null space of the target
receiver. From the figures we observe that the secrecy rate of
the proposed technique is high at all angular locations except
at the target receiver’s angular location (θR = 120
◦). We
also observe that the secrecy rate (theoretical and simulation)
achieved when using the proposed hybrid architecture, with
10 RF chains, is similar to the secrecy rate achieved when
using a fully digital architecture and when implementing the
security technique in [17]. This reduced number of RF chains
reduces the complexity and cost of the array and makes
the proposed architecture a favorable choice for mmWave
vehicular applications.
In Fig. 10, we plot the secrecy rate versus the transmission
power fraction ǫ when implementing the proposed security
technique and the technique in [17]. The figure shows that
more noise power (lower value of ǫ) is required to maximize
the secrecy rate if the eavesdropper is adjacent to the target
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Fig. 11: Secrecy rate versus the transmission power fraction
ǫ. The number of antennas is fixed to NT = 32 with 8-
bit angle quantization, θR = 120
◦, and θ = 110◦. For the
hybrid architecture, NRF = 10, and Ng = 8. In (a), artificial
noise is uniformly injected in all non-receiver directions, in
(b) artificial noise is opportunistically injected 30◦ left and 30◦
right to the receiver, and (c) artificial noise is opportunistically
injected 15◦ left and 15◦ right to the receiver.
receiver, while less noise power is required to maximize the
secrecy rate when the eavesdropper is not adjacent to the
target receiver. The reason for this is that the side lobe gain
is typically higher for angles closer to the main beam (at
θR). This gain is lower for angles that are further from the
main beam. Therefore, for the uniform noise injection case,
the value of ǫ can be opportunistically set to maximize the
secrecy rate by taking into account possible threat regions in
vehicular environments.
Finally in Figs. 11(a)-(c), we study the impact of the
transmission power fraction ǫ on the secrecy rate. In all figures
we observe that the secrecy rate is a concave function of ǫ,
and there is an optimal ǫ that maximizes the secrecy rate. The
reason for this is that as ǫ increases, more power in utilized
for symbol transmission rather than artificial noise injection.
This results in an SNR improvement at the eavesdropper and
a hit in the secrecy rate. Therefore, there is an optimum value
of ǫ that maximizes the secrecy rate. Fig. 11(a) shows that
the secrecy rate achieved by the proposed security technique
when injecting artificial noise omni-directionally (excluding
the target receiver’s direction) is similar to that achieved by
the security technique proposed in [17]. The reason for this
is that in omni-directional transmission, the array gain can
not be exploited to enhance the artificial noise. Nonetheless,
the proposed technique achieves a similar rate with 10 RF
chains when compared to [17] that requires a fully digital
architecture. Figs. 11(b) and (c) show the secrecy rate achieved
by the proposed security technique when opportunistically
injecting artificial noise in 60◦ and 30◦ sectors in the direction
of the receiver (excluding the angle θR). The figures show that
the secrecy rate of the proposed technique increases when
artificial noise is injected in predefined sectors. The reason
for this increase is that more power can be directed towards
threat directions rather than simply spreading the power across
all directions. Another reason is that the proposed technique
exploits the multiple antennas to achieve a beamforming gain
in the directions of interest, instead of injecting the noise
power in all non-receiver (or orthogonal) directions as done in
[17]. This results in a higher noise variance, and as a result,
improves the secrecy rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed two PHY security techniques for
mmWave vehicular communication systems. Both techniques
respect mmWave hardware constraints and take advantage of
the large antenna arrays at the mmWave frequencies to jam
potential eavesdropper with sensitive receivers. This enhances
the security of the data communication link between the
transmitter and the target receiver. To reduce the complexity
and cost of fully digital antenna architectures, we proposed
a new hybrid transceiver architecture for mmWave vehicular
systems. We also introduced the concept of opportunistic
noise injection and showed that opportunistic noise injection
improves the secrecy rate when compared to uniform noise
injection. The proposed security techniques are shown to
achieve secrecy rates close to that obtained by techniques that
require fully digital architectures with much lower number
of RF chains and without the need for the exchange of
encryption/decryption keys. This makes the proposed security
techniques favorable for time-critical road safety applications
and vehicular communication in general.
APPENDIX A
The random variable β in (6) can be rewritten as
β =
√
1
NT
( ∑
m∈Z(k)
ej(
NT−1
2
−m) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
−
∑
n∈OL(k)
ej(
NT−1
2
−n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
)
, (39)
where the set Z(k) = {IM (k) ∪ EL(k)}, θ 6= θR, the
cardinality of the set Z(k) is M + NT−M2 and the cardinality
of the set OL(k) is NT−M2 (see (3)). Since the entries of the
sets IM (k), EL(k), and OL(k) are randomly selected for each
data symbol, (39) can be simplified to
β =
√
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
Wne
j(NT−12 −n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR)),(40)
where Wn is a Bernoulli random variable and Wn = 1 with
probability (M + (NT − M)/2)/NT = NT+M2NT , and Wn =
−1 with probability NT−M2NT . For sufficiently large NT and
M , such that 0 < MNT < 1, the random variable Wn makes
β in (40) a sum of IID complex random variables. Invoking
the central limit theorem, β converges to a complex Gaussian
random variable. Thus, it can be completely characterized by
its mean and variance.
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To derive the mean of β, we first derive E[ℜ[β]] and E[ℑ[β]]
to obtain E[β]. From (40), the expected value of ℜ[β] can be
written as
E[ℜ[β]]=E
[
ℜ
[√
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
Wne
j(NT−12 −n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
]]
=
E[Wn]√
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
cos
((
NT − 1
2
− n)×
2πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR)
))
. (41)
Note that
E[Wn] = Pr(Wn = 1)− Pr(Wn = −1) (42)
=
NT +M
2NT
− NT −M
2NT
=
M
NT
. (43)
Using (43) and expanding (41) we obtain
E[ℜ[β]] = M
NT
√
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
cos
((
NT − 1
2
− n
)
×
2πd
λ
(cos(θ) − cos(θR))
)
=
M
N
3
2
T
(NT−1∑
n=0
cos
(
(NT − 1)πd
λ
(cos(θ) − cos(θR))
)
×
cos
(
n
2πd
λ
(cos(θ) − cos(θR))
)
+
NT−1∑
n=0
sin
(
(NT − 1)πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
×
sin
(
n
2πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR))
))
. (44)
The summation in (44) can be written in closed form as
E[ℜ[β]] = M sin(zNT/2)
NT
√
NT sin(z/2)
×(
cos2(z(NT − 1)/2) + sin2(z(NT − 1)/2)
)
=
M sin(υNT/2)
NT
√
NT sin(υ/2)
, (45)
where υ = 2πdλ (cos(θ) − cos(θR)).
Similarly, the expected value of ℑ[β] can be written as
E[ℑ[β]] = M
NT
√
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
sin
((
NT − 1
2
− n
)
×
2πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
=
M
NT
√
NT
(NT−1∑
n=0
sin
(
(NT − 1)πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR))
)
× cos
(
n
2πd
λ
(cos(θ) − cos(θR))
)
−
NT−1∑
n=0
cos
(
(NT − 1)πd
λ
(cos(θ) − cos(θR))
)
×
sin
(
n
2πd
λ
(cos(θ)− cos(θR))
))
. (46)
Expanding the term (46) we obtain
E[ℑ[β]] = M sin(υNT/2)
NT
√
NT sin(υ/2)
×(
cos(υ(NT − 1)/2 sin(υ(NT − 1)/2)−
cos(υ(NT − 1)/2 sin(υ(NT − 1)/2)
)
= 0.(47)
From (45) and (47) we obtain
E[β] = E[ℜ[β]] + E[ℑ[β]]
=
M sin(NT
πd
λ (cos(θ)− cos(θR)))
NT
√
NT sin(
2πd
λ (cos(θ) − cos(θR)))
. (48)
To derive the variance of β, we decompose β into its real
and imaginary parts as follows
var[β] = var[ℜ[β]] + var[ℑ[β]] (49)
= var
[
ℜ
[√
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
Wne
j(NT−12 −n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
]]
+
var
[
ℑ
[√
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
Wne
j(NT−12 −n) 2pidλ (cos(θ)−cos(θR))
]]
. (50)
The variance of the real component can be expressed as
var[ℜ[β]] = 1
NT
var
[NT−1∑
n=0
Wn cos
((
NT − 1
2
− n
)
×
2πd
λ
(
cos(θ)− cos(θR)
))]
=
1
NT
NT−1∑
n=0
var[Wn] cos
2
((
NT − 1
2
− n
)
×
2πd
λ
(
cos(θ)− cos(θR)
))
(51)
The value of var[Wn] in (51) can be derived as
var[Wn] = E[W
2
n ]− (E[Wn])2 (52)
= Pr(Wn = 1)(1)
2 + Pr(Wn = −1)(−1)2 −
(E[Wn])
2
=
NT +M
2NT
+
NT −M
2NT
−
(
M
NT
)2
(53)
=
N2T −M2
N2T
. (54)
Substituting the value of var[Wn] in (51) and using trigono-
metric identities we obtain
var[ℜ[β]] = N
2
T −M2
2N3T
×
(
NT +
sin
(
2πdNT
λ
(
cos(θ) − cos(θR)
))
sin
(
2πd
λ
(
cos(θ) − cos(θR)
)) ).(55)
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Similarly, the variance of the imaginary component of ℑ[β]
can be derived as
var[ℑ[β]] = N
2
T −M2
2N3T
×
(
NT −
sin
(
2πdNT
λ
(
cos(θ)− cos(θR)
))
sin
(
2πd
λ
(
cos(θ)− cos(θR)
)) ).(56)
Substituting (55) and (56) in (49) yields
var[β] =
N2T −M2
N2T
. (57)
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